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Abstract—We classify .NET files as either benign or malicious
by examining directed graphs derived from the set of functions
comprising the given file. Each graph is viewed probabilistically
as a Markov chain where each node represents a code block of
the corresponding function, and by computing the PageRank
vector (Perron vector with transport), a probability measure
can be defined over the nodes of the given graph. Each graph
is vectorized by computing Lebesgue antiderivatives of hand-
engineered functions defined on the vertex set of the given
graph against the PageRank measure. Files are subsequently
vectorized by aggregating the set of vectors corresponding to
the set of graphs resulting from decompiling the given file.
The result is a fast, intuitive, and easy-to-compute glass-box
vectorization scheme, which can be leveraged for training a
standalone classifier or to augment an existing feature space.
We refer to this vectorization technique as PageRank Measure
Integration Vectorization (PMIV). We demonstrate the efficacy of
PMIV by training a vanilla random forest on 2.5 million samples
of decompiled .NET, evenly split between benign and malicious,
from our in-house corpus and compare this model to a baseline
model which leverages a text-only feature space. The median time
needed for decompilation and scoring was 24ms. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
We classify .NET files as either malicious or benign by
understanding the structural and textual differences between
various types of labeled directed graphs resulting from de-
compilation. The graphs under consideration are the function
call graph and the set of shortsighted data flow graphs (SDFG)
derived from traversing the abstract syntax trees, one for each
function in the given file.
Each SDFG is viewed as a Markov chain and is vectorized
by considering both topological features of the unlabeled
graphs and the textual features of the nodes. Under this
paradigm, a heuristic notion of average file behavior can
be defined by computing expected values of specially-chosen
functions f ∶ Vert(G)Ð→ R defined on the vertex sets of the
given graphs against the PageRank measure.
For each graph G, we construct a filtration of subsets Gq1 ⊆⋯ ⊆ Gq∣P ∣ = Vert(G) of Vert(G) defined by specifying a
sequence of upper bounds P ∶= 0 < q1 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < q∣P ∣ = 1 on the
set of PageRank values. The resulting sequence of expected
values corresponds to a Lebesgue antiderivative Ff,G of the
function f ∶ Vert(G) Ð→ R. As there are typically many
SDFG graphs per file, we vectorize by computing, for each
1Code available at https://github.com/gtownrocks/grafuple
pair (f, qj), percentiles of {(Ff,Gk)qj}k, where k indexes the
set of SDFG’s present in the file.
Model interpretability is a consequence of our approach
by construction, because each hand-designed function f , and
therefore its antiderivative Ff,G, is interpretable.
This vectorization technique and its application to malware
classification are the main contributions of this paper.
A. Motivation
Static analysis classifiers trained on high dimensional data
can suffer from susceptibility to adversarial examples (See
[14] or [34]) due to a large proportion of the feature space
consisting of execution and semantics agnostic file features.
These include embedded unreferenced strings, certain header
information, file size, etc. See [30] or [22] for in-depth
discussions.
Ironically, many of these features are high area under the
curve features due to the copy pasta nature of most malware,
but a model trained on such features can easily be tricked by
perturbing these features. This is made possible by the fact that
altering these features has no effect on the runtime behavior
of the file.
Graph-based feature engineering approaches address this
shortcoming by considering features extracted from the se-
mantic structure of the file.
B. Related Work
The signature-based approach to malware detection histori-
cally has been characterized by hand picking features for the
sake of either a rule-based approach or a regression approach
as in [27]. Both signatures (hand-written static rules) and
regression models fit into this category. This approach is
effective on known samples, but is prone to overfitting. This
issue was the main motivator for moving towards modeling
approaches which leverage semantic structure.
The leveraging of control-flow-based vectorization of exe-
cutable files for the sake of both supervised and unsupervised
learning is well established in the literature, and has proven to
be a technique robust to overfitting and robust to adversarial
examples. Early approaches in involved differentiating files
based on sequences of api calls as in [20], in which the author
builds a model based on ngrams of api calls. See [35] and [21]
for similar approaches.
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In addition to the sequential structure of function calls, one
can also take into account the combinatorial graph structure
of the calling relationships. Anderson, B., et al. [2] construct
graph similarity kernels by viewing control flow graphs as
Markov chains. They construct a malicious/benign classifier
with these kernels, which showed significant improvement
over a model built only on function call ngrams.
Chae et al. [7] successfully leveraged the information
present in the combinatorial structure of the control flow
graph to compute the sequences and frequency of API’s by
considering a random walk kernels similar to those constructed
above. See [24] for a similar approach.
We restrict our attention in this work to decompiled .NET,
but the graph-based approach has been leveraged successfully
in the similar realm of disassembly. Indeed, [12] discusses the
use of graph similarity to compare disassembled files, which
results in a kind of file-level isomorphism useful for finding
trojans. Similar kernel methods applied to graphs arising via
disassembly have been shown to be effective at detecting
self-mutating malware by measuring the similarity between
observed control flow graphs and known control flow graphs
associated with malware. See [6] for details.
Deep learning has also been used to extend similarity detec-
tion by constructing neural networks built on top of features
derived from graph embeddings in order to measure cross-
platform binary code similarity. The neural network learns
a graph embedding for the sake of measuring control flow
graph similarity in [33]. See [26] for a similar approach using
graph convolutional networks. Graph embedding for the sake
of measuring control flow similarity has also been applied to
bug search and plagiarism detection. has also been applied to
the the problem of bug search. See [13] and [31] for details.
Reinforcement learning has also been used in the security
space to train models robust to adversarial examples as in [3]
using gradient-based attacks or non-differentiable models that
report a score can be attacked via genetic algorithms.
Pure character-level sequence approaches (LSTM/GRU),
which do not necessarily leverage the combinatorial structure
of function call or control flow graphs have also been explored,
as in [4]. The authors first train a language model in order
to learn a feature representation of the file and then train a
classifier on this latent representation. See [25] for a more
basic RNN approach.
Our approach combines the best of black-box graph convo-
lutional neural networks with model interpretability, while not
having to deal with the shortcomings of the former, including
train complexity, architecture, and the heterogeneity of graph
corpora.
II. DATA
The dataset used in this work was curated from our internal
corpus and consisted of 25 million samples of .NET, evenly
divided between benign and malicious with 2.5 million re-
maining post deduplication.
The deduplication process involved decompiling, hash-
ing each resulting function, sorting and concatenating these
hashes, and then hashing the result. The classes remained
evenly divided post deduplication.
Labels were assigned via the rule: label(file) == malicious
iff any{labeli(file) == malicious}, where i indexes the set of
vendors participating on virustotal [32] at the time of labeling.
III. DECOMPILATION OF .NET
Decompilation is a program transformation by which com-
piled code is transformed into a high-level human-readable
form, and is used in this work to study the control flow of
the files in our .NET corpus. Program control flow is under-
stood by studying the structure of two types of control flow
graphs resulting from decompilation. The function call graph
describes the calling structure of the functions (subroutines)
constituting the overall program. The control flow of each
constituent function is understood by constructing a graph
from the set of possible traversals of the associated abstract
syntax tree.
A. Abstract Syntax Trees
An abstract syntax tree is a binary tree representation of the
syntactic structure of the given routine in terms of operators
and operands.
For example, consider the expression
5 ∗ 3 + (4 + 2 % 2 ∗ 8)
consisting of mathematical operators and numeric operands.
We may express the syntactic structure of this expression with
the binary tree:
+
*
5 3
+
4 *
%
2 2
8
The root and the subsequent internal nodes represent operators
and the leaves represent operands. The distilled semantic
structure in this case is the familiar order of operations for
arithmetic expressions.
More generally, each node of an AST represents some
construct occurring in the source code, and a directed edge
connects two nodes if the code representing the target node
conditionally executes immediately after the code represented
by the source node. These trees facilitate the distillation of the
semantics of the program.
B. Abstract Syntax Trees for the CLR
Each node of a given AST is labeled by an operation
performed on the Common Language Runtime (CLR) virtual
machine. A subset of these operations is listed as follows (see
Appendix B for the complete list and the details thereof):
● AddressOf● Assignment● BinaryOp● break● Call● ClassRef● CLRArray
● continue● CtorCall● Dereference● Entrypoint● FieldReference● FnPtrObj● LocalVar
Example III.1. An AST snippet from a benign .NET sample.
{. . .
”30”:{
”type”:”LocalVar”,
”name”:”variable7”
},
”28”:{
”type”:”LocalVar”,
”name”:”locals[0]”
},
”29”:{
”type”:”CLRVariableWithInitializer”,
”varType”:”System.Web.UI”,
”name”:”variable8”,
”value”:”28”
},
”64”:{
”fnName”:”AddParsedSubObject”,
”type”:”Call”,
”target”:”62”,
”arguments”:[
”63”
]
. . .}
As shown in the example, the metadata available at each
node is a function of the CLR operation being performed at
that node.
C. Traversals of Abstract Syntax Trees
We consider all possible execution paths through a given
abstract syntax tree and merge these paths together to form a
shortsighted data flow graph (SDFG). Consider the following
code snippet:
Example III.2. Small code block resulting in a nonlinear
SDFG.
if foo() {
bar();
}
foo
bar baz
bla
ev to true ev to false
Fig. 1: SDFG: Merging the two possible evaluation paths through
this block yields the SDFG.
else {
baz();
}
bla();
The two possible execution paths through this code snippet
are given by foo() Ð→ bar() Ð→ bla() and foo() Ð→
baz()Ð→ bla(). See Figure 1 for the resulting SDFG.
D. Function Call Graphs
The function call graph represents the calling relationships
between the subroutines of the file. The function call graphs
in our corpus tended to be less linear than the SDFGs, and
contained features which improved accuracy. Notably these
features were purely text-based and were not derived via the
imposition of a Markov structure, PageRank computation, and
subsequent Lebesgue integration.
IV. THE PAGERANK VECTOR
The PageRank vector describes the long-run diffusion of
random walks through a strongly connected directed graph.
Indeed, the probability measure over the nodes obtained via
repeated multiplication of an initial distribution vector over the
nodes by the associated probability transition matrix converges
to the PageRank vector, and is in practice a very efficient
method for computing it to a close approximation.
Intuitively, the PageRank vector is obtained by considering
many random walks through the given graph and for each node
computing the number of times we observed the walker at the
given node as a proportion of all observations.
Viewing the graph in question as a Markov chain we order
the vertices {vi} of the graph G and define the n×n probability
transition matrix T by
tij = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1/∣v
out
i ∣ if (vi, vj) ∈ Edges(G)
0 otherwise
(1)
where vouti is the set of edges emanating from vertex vi and
n = ∣Vert(G)∣.
In order to apply the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the proba-
bility transition matrix T constructed via row-normalizing the
adjacency matrix A = (aij), where aij = 1 if there is an edge
from node i to node j and 0 otherwise, must be irreducible.
To this end, we add a smoothing term B to obtain the matrix
M = (1 − p)T + pB, (2)
where
B = 1
n
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 . . .⋮ ⋱
1 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The addition of the term pB ensures the irreducibility of M
as required by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, where p is the
probability of the Markov chain moving between any two
vertices without traversing an edge and governs the extent to
which the topology of the original graph is ignored.
The resulting Markov chain is defined by
P (Xt = vi∣Xt−1 = vj) = (1 − p)tij + p 1
n
,
where in this work we heuristically set p = 0.15. The sensitiv-
ity of the results to p is left to a future paper.
Note IV.1. One can view this concept in the context of a
running program as the repeated calling of a particular function
as represented by the SDFG, where the
Theorem IV.2. Perron-Frobenius. If M is an irreducible
matrix then M has a unique eigenvector pi with eigenvalue
1.
The eigenvector pi is such that ∑pii = 1, so defines a
probability measure over the vertices of G, which we will
write as PG, or just P if the reference graph is either clear
from the context or irrelevant.
V. INTEGRATION OF FUNCTIONS ON GRAPHS
Given two labeled graphs G,H , and a mapping f ∶
Vert(G) ⊔ Vert(H) Ð→ R, where f assigns a real number
to each element v of the disjoint union Vert(G) ⊔ Vert(H)
based on the label of v, the connectivity at v, or some other
scheme, a pointwise comparison of f ∣Vert(G) and f ∣Vert(H)
may not be possible. Consider for example the simple case of∣Vert(G)∣ ≠ ∣Vert(H)∣.
We address this difficulty by defining a probability measure
PG ∶ Vert(G) Ð→ [0,1] for each G ∈ Γ, where Γ is a set of
labeled directed graph. Then for any subset I ⊂ [0,1], we can
directly compare the Lebesgue integrals ∫I f ∣Vert(G)dPG and∫I f ∣Vert(H)dPH .
Let P be the PageRank vector given by the unique left
eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of the probability transition
matrix of the directed graph G, viewed as a Markov chain.
Each file under consideration contains multiple graphs, and
we wish to find a way to not only compare these graphs, but
understand the ensemble of graphs in the given file.
Let P be a partition of [0,1] and let G be a directed
graph. Let PG be the probability measure on Vert(G) given
by the PageRank vector P = ⟨pv⟩. Consider a function
f ∶ Vert(G)Ð→ R. The function
Ff,G ∶ P Ð→ R (3)
q ↦ E[f ∣Gq ],
where Gq = {v ∈ Vert(G) ∣pv ≤ q}, and E[f ∣Gq ] =∫Gq fdPG = ∑v∈Gq f(v)pv . Mathematically Ff,G is the
Lebesgue antiderivative of f over Vert(G) with measure given
by PG.
The above process of building a function F on P from a
graph G and a rule f which can be applied consistently to any
element of Γ can be formulated as a mapping
Γ × Fun(⊔
Γ
Vert(G),R)Ð→ Fun(P,R)
(G,f)↦ (Ff,G ∶ q ↦ E[f ∣Gq ]), (4)
where Fun(X,Y ) is the set of functions from X to Y .
VI. SIMILARITY MEASURE ON GRAPH SPACE
Let ΓA be the set of directed graphs with vertices labeled
from the alphabet A. Define the vectorization map
V ∶ ΓA Ð→ R∣S∣∣P ∣ (5)
G↦ (E[fi∣Gqj ])
where the expected value is taken with respect to the PageRank
measure as defined in the previous section.
We construct a similarity function via (5)
S ∶ ΓA × ΓA Ð→ R
(G,H) ↦ ∥V(G) −V(H)∥p
= ⎛⎝∑ij ∣E[fi∣Gqj ] −E[fi∣Hqj ]∣p⎞⎠
1
p
for fi ∈ S, qj ∈ P , and p >= 1.
Definition VI.1. A metric on a set X is a function
d ∶X ×X Ð→ [0,∞)
satisfying
(i) d(x, y) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = y
(ii) d(x, y) = d(y, x)
(iii) d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z)
Condition (ii) is satisfied since ∣a−b∣ = ∣b−a∣ for all a, b ∈ R
and (iii) is satisfied since V(G) ∈ Rk for all G by construction.
However, it is possible that S(G,H) = 0 for G ≄ H ,
meaning that while S is effective as a measure of similarity
of labeled directed graphs, it is not a metric on ΓA.
Indeed, let G = {a ∶ b}, H = {a ∶ c}, and let S = {f} where
f ∶ Vert(G) Ð→ R is defined by v ↦ int(label(v) == a).
Then V(G) = V(H), which implies S(G,H) = 0. The graphs
G and H have the same topology and the same combinatorial
structure, but the set of functions S is insufficient to distinguish
V(G) from V(H).
Additional conditions must be imposed on ΓA and the
functions defined thereon in order to guarantee the injectivity
of V, a necessary condition for S to define a metric. We leave
this analysis to a future paper.
VII. APPLICATION OF LEBESGUE INTEGRATION ON
GRAPHS TO SDFGS
The machinery developed in the previous sections lends
itself to two immediate applications.
The first is the use of the vectorization map
Vect ∶ FilesÐ→ Rk (6)
file
decompÐÐÐÐ→ {GSDFG} Eq (4)ÐÐÐ→ {vGSDFG,f} (7)
applied to .NET files, constructed via decompilation followed
by integration of selected functions on SDFGs as described in
Equation (4), to i) construct an N -class classifier on a given
corpus of labeled .NET files, and ii) cluster these files in Rk
using any of the classic metrics defined on Euclidean space.
The second application is classification and clustering of
.NET files within the metric space Γ, described in Section VI.
The remainder of this paper concerns the applications of the
vectorization map Vect ∶ FilesÐ→ Rk.
A. Feature Hashing
Feature hashing allows for the vectorization of data which
is both categorical in nature and is such that the full set
of categories is unknown at the time of vectorization. We
construct a hash map on strings by wrapping the hash function
from the Python standard library as follows:
η ∶ string↦ log10(max(1, ∣hash(string)∣)
We take a log in order to bring the integer resulting from the
hash function down to a more aesthetic size. This has no effect
on the model as random forests are agnostic to the magnitudes
of feature values.
B. Functions on SDFGs
For the sake of clarity, we illustrate the typical form such a
function takes with an example. Consider the SDFG snippet
given in Example III.1. We define the function
CLRVariable ∶ v ↦ η(varType(v))
by
v29 ↦ η(varType(v29))= η(‘System.Web.UI’)= log10(max(1, ∣hash(‘System.Web.UI’)∣)
The complete set of functions
f ∶ Vert(SDFG)Ð→ R
leveraged in this work is listed in Appendix A.
C. Lebesgue Integration of Functions on SDFGs
Because the nodeset of any SDFG is finite and the PageRank
measure defined thereon is discrete, the Lebesgue antideriva-
tives of the functions defined in the previous section take the
form of sequences of dot products.
We illustrate the nature of the map {GSDFG} Eq (4)ÐÐÐ→{vGSDFG,f} via an example.
Example VII.1. Consider a SDFG G representing the
traversals of some function’s abstract syntax tree. Assume
Vert(G) = {v1, v2, v3, v4} and that PageRank(G) = ⟨pv1 =
0.1, pv2 = 0.15, pv3 = 0.25, pv4 = 0.5⟩. Assume the
nodes v1, v4 ∈ Vert(G) both correspond to function calls
φvi(argsvi), where argsvi represent the set of arguments
passed to φvi .
NumPass2Call ∶ Vert(G)Ð→ R (8)
vi ↦ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩#argsvi if i ∈ {1,4}0 otherwise (9)
Take the partition of [0,1] defined byP = [0.05,0.12,0.20,0.95]
The Lebesgue antiderivative of NumPass2Call on G
FNumPass2Call,G ∶ P Ð→ R
q ↦ E[NumPass2Call∣Gq ],
takes the form
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.05
0.12
0.20
0.95
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠↦
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0.1 ∗#argsv1
0
0.1 ∗#argsv1 + 0.5 ∗#argsv4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
In general, each entry of the vector Ff,G =(E[f ∣Gq1 ], . . . ,E[f ∣Gq∣P ∣ ]) is a linear combination of
the form S = ∑piri, where pi is the element of the PageRank
vector assigned to node i and ri is a real number resulting
from applying f to node i.
VIII. VECTORIZATION OF FUNCTION CALL GRAPHS
The features of the form f ∶ Vert(G)Ð→ R extracted from
the function call graphs are limited to:
● CryptoFlag
v ↦ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if crypto flag ∈ v0 if crypto flag ∉ v
This function, unlike those applied to the SDFGs, is not
integrated. We simply include the cryto flag as a feature
directly.
The remaining features extracted from the function call
graphs are combinatorial and topological in nature.
Let GC be the function call graph for a single .NET file and
let C = {c1, . . . , cN} be the connected components thereof. Let
deg(v) represent the number of edges connected to the vertex
Fig. 2: PageRank Distributions The PageRank measure defined on
the nodes of a given graph depends on the topology of the
graph, and thus the expected values E[f ∣Gq ] of functions
f ∶ Gq Ð→ R also depend on the topology of the graph,
where Gq = {v ∈ Vert(G)∣pv ≤ q} for pv the PageRank of
node v and 0 < q < 1.
Fig. 3: ClassRef ExpectedType 60: We compute the standard de-
viation of the set of expected values E[(v ↦ (type(v) ==
ClassRef))∣G0.60] indexed by the set of SDFGs G resulting
from decompilation, where we take type(v) == ClassRef to
be one of true and 0 if false. There is one such expected value
per SDFG graph and this feature is obtained by computing
the mean of the set of these expected values across all SDFGs
in the file.
v ∈ Vert(GC). Let L = {∣c1∣, ∣c2∣, . . . , ∣cN ∣} where ∣ci∣ is the
number of nodes of component i. We extract the following
features:
● max(L)/min(L)● N● mean({deg(v)∣v ∈ Vert(GC)})● std({deg(v)∣v ∈ Vert(GC)})● ∣Vert(GC)∣● ∣Edges(GC)∣
IX. EXPERIMENTS
We compare PMIV to a baseline method we call Uniform
Measure Integration Vectorization (UMIV).
Uniform Measure Integration Vectorization is similar to
PMIV in that the method is defined by computing a graph-
based integral of functions defined over the node sets, where
these functions are exactly those used for PMIV. The critical
difference is that UMIV is defined via integration against the
uniform measure.
This means that instead of computing
Ff,G = (E[f ∣Gq1 ], . . . ,E[f ∣Gq∣P ∣ ])
as in defined via Equation (3), we compute
FUf,G ∶= 1∣Vert(G)∣ ∑v∈Vert(G) f(v), (10)
i.e., a simple average of the given function over the node set
of the given graph. PMIV and UMIV similarly leverage the
textual information embedded in SDFGs, but UMIV ignores
the combinatorial structure of the SDFGs.
A. Parsing (same for PMIV and UMIV)
Each .NET file is decompiled resulting in i) an abstract
syntax tree for each function within the file and ii) the function
call graph. The abstract syntax trees are traversed individually
resulting in a single SDFG for each function within the file.
The function call graph is a directed graph indicating which
functions call which other functions.
Example IX.1. Consider the C# program
using System;
class Hello
{
static void Main()
{
Console.WriteLine(”Hello, World!”);
}
}
Three graphs result from decompilation - an empty function
call graph and two linear SDFG graphs. See Appendix ?? for
the decompiler output.
B. Vectorization (PMIV)
Each file is vectorized by applying both the vectorization
map (6) to the set of shortsighted data flow graphs (many per
file) and the vectorization of the function call graph (one per
file) as described in Section VIII.
1) SDFG: Given a file marked by its hash h, we consider
a set of SDFG graphs {Ghi } obtained by decompiling h.
For each function f ∶ ⊔ΓVert(G) Ð→ R, hash h, and
partition P , we can compute the values⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ff,G1(q1) . . . Ff,G1(q∣P ∣)⋮
Ff,Gn(q1) . . . Ff,Gn(q∣P ∣)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
We can then compute both the mean and standard deviation
of the set {Ff,Ghi (qj)} for each qj ∈ P . As the number of
SDFGs varies by file, this is necessary to guarantee that every
file in the corpus can be mapped to Rk for some fixed k.
The file h is mapped, via integrating f over
G, to the feature space given by coordinates{µ({Ff,Ghi (qj)}i)}j ⋃{σ({Ff,Ghi (qj)}i)}j
The file h is then described by the feature vector given by
⊕
f
(µ({Ff,Ghi (qj)}i))j ⊕ (σ({Ff,Ghi (qj)}i))j
where f is an index running over the set of functions f ∶
Vert(G) ∶Ð→ R.
2) Function Call Graphs: The function call graph features
are included as components of the final file-level vector
directly without computing means and standard deviations, as
there is a single such graph per file.
C. Vectorization (UMIV)
Files are vectorized in essentially the same way as in PMIV,
except that we assign the probability 1/∣Vert(G)∣ to each
vertex v ∈ Vert(G) for G a SDFG.
The vectorization scheme is defined in Equation (10), and
the final reduction of these values across SDFGs into a single
vector corresponding to a single file is identical to that of
PMIV.
D. Algorithm
We train a separate random forest for each vectorization
method, each with identical hyperparameters.
A random forest is an ensemble learning method for classifi-
cation, regression, and other tasks that operates by constructing
a multitude of decision trees at training time and scoring via
a polling (classification) or averaging (regression) procedure
over its constituent trees.
This algorithm is especially valuable in malware classifica-
tion as scoring inaccuracy caused by unavoidable label noise
is somewhat mitigated by the ensemble.
E. Training and Validation (same for PMIV and UMIV)
The .NET corpus was first deduplicated via decompilation
by first decompiling each file, hashing each resulting graph,
lexicographically sorting and concatenating these hashes, and
then hashing the result.
The deduplicated corpus was split into training (70%),
validation (10%), and test (20%) sets. We used the grid
search functionality of scikit-learn with cross-validation for
hyperparameter tuning of the random forest. The optimal
model is described in Table I.
TABLE I: Random Forest Hyperparameters
max leaf nodes None
min samples leaf 1
warm start False
min weight fraction leaf 0
oob score False
min samples split 2
criterion gini
class weight None
min impurity split 2.09876756095e-05
n estimators 480
max depth None
bootstrap True
max features sqrt
TABLE II: PMIV Performance
Class Precision Recall F1-score Support
Benign 97.88% 99.37% 98.62% 696827
Malware 98.94% 96.47% 97.69% 424420
avg/total 98.28% 98.27% 98.27% 1121247
False Positive Rate 1.10%
False Negative Rate 1.72%
TABLE III: UMIV Performance
Class Precision Recall F1-score Support
Benign 90.61% 87.04% 88.79% 696827
Malware 87.80% 91.18% 89.46% 424420
avg/total 89.19% 89.13% 89.13% 1121247
False Positive Rate 8.79%
False Negative Rate 12.96%
X. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Accuracy, Precision, Recall (PMIV and UMIV)
The model is 98.3% accurate on the test set using only 400
features, which is tiny for a static classifier.
The precision on malicious files was 98.94%, meaning that
of the files classified as malicious by the model, 98.94% of
them were actually malicious. Precision on benign files was
97.88% and recall on benign files was 99.37%.
The recall on malicious files was 96.47%, meaning that of
the malicious files, 96.47% of them were correctly scored as
malicious. Of the four precision/recall values, malicious recall
was the weakest. There are very likely features of malicious
.NET files that are not captured by the set of functions f ∶
Vert(G)Ð→ R we currently leverage to construct our feature
space.
As shown in tables II and III, our graph-structure-based
vectorization method PMIV outperforms our baseline UMIV
method by wide margins, demonstrating the efficacy of our
graph integration construction.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have engineered a robust control flow graph-based vec-
torization scheme for exposing features which reveal seman-
tically interesting constructs of .NET files. The vectorization
scheme is interpretable and glass-box by construction, which
will facilitate scalable taxonomy operations in addition to
high-accuracy classification as benign or malicious.
The control flow-type graphs include both function call
graphs, one for each file, and SDFG graphs, one for each
function defined within the file. Leveraging the combinatorial
structure of these graphs results in a rich feature space, within
which even a simple classifier can effectively distinguish
between benign and malicious files.
The vectorization scheme introduced here may be leveraged
to train a standalone model or to augment the feature space
of an existing model. Although we limited our experiments
to decompiled .NET, we see no obstruction to applying the
PMIV concept to a wider class of graph-based file data, such
as disassembly.
Future work will involve the addition of new functions
f ∶ Vert(G) Ð→ R for control flow-type graphs G to the
vectorization scheme, as well as the clustering of files and the
functions of which they consist within both the codomain of
the vectorization map and within the graph space Γ. We will
also explore the extent to which these functions and files can
be parameterized through manifold learning in Euclidean as
well as graph space.
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APPENDIX
A. Complete List of Functions on SDFGs
All functions are assumed to be zero on nodes for which
the associated AST member is inconsistent with the function
definition. For example, NumPass2Call is trivial on all non-
Call nodes.● ExpectedType
v, s↦ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if type(v) == s0 otherwise● CLRVariable ∶ v ↦ η(varType(v))● BinaryOp ∶ v ↦ η(whichOpCode(v))● CtorCallctorType ∶ v ↦ η(ctorType(v))
● FieldReference ∶ v ↦ η(fieldName(v))● CLRLiteral ∶ v ↦ value(v)● CallfnName ∶ v ↦ η(fnName(v))● CLRArrayelemType ∶ v ↦ η(elemType(v))● FnPtrObjname ∶ v ↦ η(name(v))● TypeTesttestedType ∶ v ↦ η(testedType(v))● ClassRefname ∶ v ↦ η(name(v))● TypeCast ∶ v ↦ η(castedType(v))● CLRArraysize ∶ v ↦ η(elemType(v))● NumPass2Call ∶ v ↦#(arguments(v))● AddressOf ∶ v ↦ expr(v)● ThrowOpexpr ∶ v ↦ expr(v)● UnaryOpexpr ∶ v ↦ expr(v)● StoreLocallocalIdx ∶ v ↦ localIdx(v)● StoreLocalvalue ∶ v ↦ value(v)● Returnvalue
v ↦ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩value(v) if type(value(v)) == float0 if type(value(v)) == dict
Note that value(v), expr(v) are floats and
#arguments(v), localIdx(v) are ints.
B. CLR AST Dictionary
The dictionary of terms relating to the CLR is as follows:
CLR AST Dictionary
The CLR decompiler produces an AST that consists of elements heavily derived from the operations that may be performed on the CLR virtual
machine. This is intentional so that the initially produced AST closely maps to operations in the source binary, leaving abstraction and
normalization up to later stages of processing.
These same AST members show up in traversals of the AST as well, both in the form of Data Flow Graphs and Shortsighted Data Flow Graphs
(SDFGs).
The AST members, thusly, map closely to C#-related language features, or in some cases language agnostic structures. In the former category is
"PInvokeCall", which is a special type of function call that allows the CLR runtime to branch into native (architecture-specific, like x86 or ARM)
code, versus a "Call", which is any CLR-internal call (which may still call into foreign libraries, but call targets are by definition CLR code).
Blue-filled rows indicate CLR-specific or C#-specific AST members. Language-agnostic structures - primarily control flow - are left default.
Control Flow
AST Member Code Example Description
If if (expr) { 
  _true_branch_
} else {
  _false_branch_
}
Bog-standard control flow. If references the conditional, true branch, and false
branch. If the conditional is true, _true_branch_ is executed, otherwise
_false_branch_ (if present) is executed.
break break; Immediately exit the enclosing loop.
continue continue; Immediately jump to the beginning of the enclosing loop, including evaluating
the loop's exit condition, if any.
CLRWhile while (true) { <statements> } CLRWhile specifically describes an infinite loop, leaving exits to be handled as,
approximately, "if (!condition) { break; }"
Entrypoint N/A A special token indicating the start of a function for AST or control flow graph.
Return return [<A>] Return from the containing function, optionally returning a value yielded by the
expression <A>.
ThrowOp throw <A> Throw the exception resulting from expression <A>. No special "catch"
semantics as we currently do not handle the "catch" side of a "try"/"catch"
block.
Expressions
Expressions are code that when evaluated  yield a value. Expressions are valid in places such as tests for loops and conditionals, or as thedo
right-hand side of assignments.
AST Member Code Example Description
BinaryOp <A> _oper_ <B> An abstract representation of an expression computed from two operands and some operator
on them. A and B may be any expressions, and _oper_ may be any operator, typically
arithmetic (+, -, *, \), bitwise (|, ^, &), or comparison (>, <, >=, <=, ==, !=). Note: this will  benot
=, even for languages where "<A> = <B>" is a valid expression.
UnaryOp _oper_ <A> An abstract representation of an expression computed from one operand and an operator on
it. A may be any expression, and _oper_ may be any operator, typically negation, either
arithmetic (-), bitwise (~), or logical (!)
AddressOf &<A> An expression yielding the address of the result of some expression <A>. This is distinct from
UnaryOp only because it is special to the CLR.
ArgumentReference <the name of a
function argument>
A reference, but specifically to an argument of the function which contains this AST element.
ArrayIndex <A>[<B>] An indexing operation into the array yielded by <A>, with index <B>
CLRArray new <A>[<B>] A new array of <B>-many elements of <A>. Array initializers with values are initialized in
subsequent assignment expressions, even though C#-the-language allows them as part of an
array declaration.
CLRLiteral "A", 1, 'c', ... Any valid literal to the CLR. This may be a string, integer, float, char, ...
Call <A>.<B>(<a1>, <a2>,
...)
A call of function <B> on the result of <A>, with argument list <a1>, <a2>, ... <a_n>. <A> may
either be an expression producing some type or, for static functions, will be a ClassRef
expression. <A>.<B> will not name a constructor.
ClassRef <A> The class named by a the fully qualified name <A>. For example, System.String, or
System.Collections.Generic.List.
CtorCall <A>..ctor(<a1>, <a2>,
...)
A call of some .ctor method on type <A> with argument list <a1>, <a2>, ... <a_n>. This is
distinct from Call only because the CLR distinguishes constructor calls from typical calls.
Dereference *<A> Dereference of some pointer yielded by <A>, producing the value at the pointed location.
FieldReference <A>.<B> An expression yielding the value named by <B> on <A> (either an instance or class
reference). If <A> is a ClassRef, <B> names a static field.
FnPtrObj N/A A handle to some function that can subsequently be called or otherwise operated on.
LocalVar <A> A variable declared at some point before reference by either CLRVariable or
CLRVariableWithInitializer statements.
NullRef null A special value to express "null".
PInvokeCall <A>.<B>(<a1>, <a2>,
...)
A call in the same form as a Call expression, expect specifically referencing functions declared
with a PInvoke attribute, calling some architecture-specific non-CLR code.
TypeCast <A> as <B> A type cast of the result of expression <A> to the type <B>. If the cast is invalid, this yields
null. This does   correspond to C# code like (<A>)<B> for casts, as those casts have nonot
immediately visible result when compiled to the CLR.
TypeTest <A> is <B> A test returning true if the result of expression <A> can be cast to <B>, false otherwise.
Statements
Statements are code that when evaluated do not yield a value. Eg, a statement cannot be on the right-hand side of an assignment.
AST Member Code Example Description
Assignment <A> = <B> Storage of <B> to the location yielded by <A>. <A> will always be an expression,
but some expressions are not valid in the left-hand side of an assignment.
CLRVariable <type> <A> Declaration of a variable type <type> named <A>.
CLRVariableWithInitializer <type> <A> = <B> Declaration of a variable type <type> named <A>, and subsequent initialization to
the result of <B>.
StoreArg <A> = <B> An assignment specifically to an argument of the containing function. This
generally comes from storing to a "ref" or "out" variable in C# code.
StoreLocal <A> = <B> An assignment to any local variable declared by a CLRVariable or
CLRVariableWithInitializer statement.
